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LIQUIDATED DAMAGES IN ILLINOIS CONTRACTS
Liquidated damages are a sum which a contracting party agrees to pay,
or a deposit which he agrees to forfeit, if he breaches some promise. The
stipulated amount must have been arrived at by a bona fide effort to estimate
in advance the actual damage which would probably result from the breach
in order to be recoverable or retainable as agreed damages if the breach
occurs. Frequently, what would appear to be a liquidated damages provision
in a contract is held to be a penalty. A penalty is also a sum which a party
agrees to pay or forfeit in the event of a breach. The difference lies in that
in the case of a penalty the stipulated amount is fixed, not as a bona fide
estimate of actual damages, but as a punishment, the threat of which is
calculated to prevent a breach. Where such a provision is held to be for a
penalty, rather than for liquidated damages, it is void, and the party seeking
to collect damages is limited to those actual damages which he is able to
prove.'
Most first year law students who have studied Contracts are aware of
the rule that a liquidated damages clause is enforceable only if it provides,
in fact, for liquidated damages, and not for a penalty. Nevertheless, they
probably would encounter difficulty in attempting to explain with any
degree of particularity the criteria or standards to be utilized in judging the
validity of an apparent liquidated damages provision. They need not feel
alone, however, for the courts have also been thwarted:
This court has said more than once that no branch of the law is
involved in more obscurity by contradictory decisions than whether
a sum specified in an agreement to secure performance will be
treated as liquidated damages or a penalty and that each case must
depend upon its own peculiar and attendant circumstances, and
on this subject are very often of
that therefore general rules of law
2
very little practical significance.
Merely in order to emphasize the frustrating nature of the topic, it should
be noted that in espousing the vagaries of the subject, the judge in the
quoted material referred to "a sum specified in an agreement to secure performance" as either liquidated damages or a penalty. Technically, this is
incorrect because "a sum specified . . . to secure performance" is by definition a penalty.
The purpose of this article is to attempt to explore those standards or
criteria which the courts have applied in resolving issues pertaining to
liquidated damages. As a precaution, one would do well to remember that
frequently the courts have done little else than state conclusions with little
or no explanation as to how such were deduced.
I McCormick, Damages § 146 (1st ed. 1935).
2

Giesecke v. Cullerton, 280 IH. 519, 513, 117 N.E. 777, 778 (1917).
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THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE

For many years it has been the policy of the courts to constitute
themselves the guardians and protectors of the individual who,
though competent to contract, has entered into an improvident
agreement to pay an exorbitant sum of money in event of his default in some respect which does not, in fact, cause anything like
equivalent damage to the other party. Such a provision is called a
penalty, and the courts refuse to enforce it.s
As a preliminary matter, some consideration should be directed to the
question of why the judiciary has felt compelled to concern itself with the
validity or invalidity of liquidated damages clauses. After all, if a party
knowingly promises that he will pay a certain sum in the event he breaches
his contract, why should he be able to "worm" his way out of fulfilling that
promise at a later date? Actually, the cases discuss this matter little or not at
all. However, one may speculate with some degree of certainty as to the
reasons behind the rule. Initially, the fundamental aim of damages is to
compensate an injured party for the harm caused him by another's breach
of duty, and in the case of contract damages specifically to put him in the
place he would have been had the contract been performed. Except in rare
cases involving exemplary damages, punishment of the injuring party is
not the goal. Consequently, it follows that contracting parties should not
be able to accomplish by agreement that which the law has declined to permit, i.e., punishment of the defendant. Secondly, the rule is probably aimed
to protect those overly zealous individuals who agree to pay liquidated damages largely because their exuberance does not allow them to foresee the
possibility of their breaching. Finally, the courts probably feel that oftentimes such clauses have been the product of situations wherein the parties
had a significantly disproportionate bargaining power and in other respects
resembled circumstances attendant adhesion clauses.
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES CLAUSES GENERALLY

In general, in order for a provision for payment of a stipulated amount
incident to a breach of contract to be deemed one for liquidated damages,
it is necessary that the damages contemplated from a breach be uncertain
and difficult of ascertainment; 4 that the parties intended to liquidate them
in advance; 5 and that the sum provided for is reasonable,6 i.e., it bears some
relation to the presumable loss or injury.7 The question as to whether a
contract clause provides for liquidated damages or a penalty is a question
of law. In resolving the issue, the court will normally look to the contract
8 Burnett v. Nolen, 336 IUl. App. 376, 379, 84 N.E.2d 155, 156 (4th Dist. 1949).
4 Gibb v. Merrill, 234 Ill. App. 267 (2d Dist. 1924).
5 Burnett v. Nolen, supra note 3; Gibb v. Merrill, supra note 4.
e Parker-Washington Co. v. City of Chicago, 267 Ill. 136, 107 N.E. 872 (1915); Christian
Mills v. Berthold Stein Flour Co., 247 Ill. App. 1 (Ist Dist. 1927).
T Gibb v. Merrill, supra note 4.
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as a whole and also consider the facts and circumstances surrounding the
making of the contract.8
THE UNCERTAINTY OF ASCERTAINING DAMAGES

In Parker-Washington Co. v. City of Chicago,9 Parker had contracted
to lay three foundations for a pumping station and to complete the work by
December 22, 1909. The contract provided that in the event Parker failed
to complete the work on time, the sum of $50 for each day it was late would
be deducted from the contract price. Parker completed the work 73 days
after the stipulated completion date and the city withheld $3650 in accordance with the contract provision. Parker brought an action to recover this
amount, contending that the provision was void as a penalty. In upholding
the validity of the clause, the court said that there could be no doubt as to
the uncertainty of damages. The pumping station was for the benefit of
private citizens. In the event of a failure to complete it on time, no injury
would result directly to the city. However, injury would doubtless occur to
those for whose benefit the station was being built. A water shortage would
increase the threat of fire and in other ways make living less enjoyable for
the people in the neighborhood affected. 10 Who could reasonably calculate
with any degree of certainty the extent of such injury?
Contracts for the sale of land also lend themselves to valid liquidated
damages clauses because of uncertainty of ascertaining damages. For example, in Gibb v. Merrill," defendant contracted to sell real property to
plaintiff for $7800. The contract provided that in the event of a failure by
the seller to convey that he should pay the buyer $800 as liquidated damages.
In an action by plaintiff to recover this amount, the court upheld the clause
because, inter alia, of the impossibility of determining the extent of injury
2
suffered by virtue of being deprived of the particular plot in question.1
McCormick in his work on Damages points out that too much stress
should not be placed on the uncertainty of ascertaining damages factor in
predicting the validity of a provision for stipulated damages."3 He explains
that, except in case of a promise to pay money, and sometimes even in that
situation, it is very difficult to anticipate with any degree of exactness the
damages which will arise from a breach of any contract. Consequently, there
are very few instances where courts have refused to enforce stipulated damages provisions on the ground that actual damages would be easily ascertainable. He notes that in most cases the courts have relied on the fact that the
8 Giesecke v. Cullerton, 280 Il1. 510, 117 N.E. 777 (1917).
9 Supra note 6.
10 Id. at 140-1, 107

N.E. at 874-5.
App. 267 (2d Dist. 1924).
11 234 111.
12 Id. at 274.
13 McCormick, Damages § 148 (st ed. 1935).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW

REVIEW

amount agreed to be paid was grossly disproportionate to the actual loss in
14
refusing to enforce such provisions.
THE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES

Another controlling factor in determining whether a stipulated sum is
a penalty or liquidated damages is the intention of the parties. 15 For where
the claim fixing the amount of damages appears to have been inserted mainly
to secure prompt performance of the agreement it will be treated as a
penalty. 16
In Van Kanel v. Higley,'7 the defendant had contracted to build a house
for the plaintiff and "to forfeit and pay .. .as liquidated damages the sum
of $600."'S if he failed to complete the work by a set date. The defendant
breached the contract, but refused to pay the $600, contending it was a
penalty. Referring to the problem of determining when a clause is for liquidated damages and when it is for a penalty, the court said:
Much of the trouble encountered in harmonizing the authorities upon this point will disappear, if we will remember that the
real intention to be sought for is whether or not the parties, after
having mutually and in good faith considered and calculated the
actual damages, intended the sum fixed by this contract to be
accepted as compensation for breach of the9 contract, or merely as
security or penalty for the breach thereof.'
In holding the clause in issue to be a penalty, the court emphasized the
use of the word "forfeit" and the fact that the $600 could not be viewed as
damages for delay since a flat amount of money was to be paid regardless
of whether the defendant was one day late or two months behind. These
facts indicated that it was the intention of the parties to impose a penalty in
order to secure performance.
As was noted in the Van Kanel case, the language used in the provision
itself is often a very significant indicator of the parties' intention. County
of Mercer v. Stupp Bros. Bridge & Iron Co.20 illustrates the point clearly.
Stupp Bros. contracted to build a bridge across a stream for the county and
agreed to pay "a penalty" of $5 for each day the bridge was not completed
after January 1, 1903. Stupp Bros. finished the bridge twenty days late. The
county withheld $100 from the contract price in accordance with the liquidated damages clause. Stupp Bros. claimed the provision was invalid as a
penalty and brought an action to recover the $100. The county sought to
14 Ibid.

505, 514, 38 N.E. 1058, 1060 (1894).
15 Hennessy v. Metzger, 152 Ill.
190 (1880).
16 Scofield v. Tompkins, 95 Ill.
17 172 Ill. App. 88 (lst Dist. 1912).
is Id. at 90.
19 Id. at 91.
20 115 Ill. App. 298 (2d Dist. 1904).
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prove that the sum provided for was not a "penalty," notwithstanding the
language employed. The court held that the county was bound by the word
"penalty." Thus, it would appear that although it may be demonstrated
that a clause which provides for "liquidated damages" is, in fact, for a
penalty, the reverse is not true, i.e., if the clause reads "penalty," one is not
permitted to show that liquidated damages was intended.
It has been seen that mere usage of the words "liquidated damages" in
the contract provision in issue does not irrebuttably demonstrate that it
was the intention of the parties to liquidate damages rather than impose a
penalty. On the other hand, the words "penalty" and "forfeit" conclusively
show an intention to impose a penalty. In Arco Bag Co., Inc. v. Facings,
Inc.,21 a third situation was presented, namely, where the parties used none
of the aforementioned words. Under a contract clause labelled "Miscellaneous," Arco was given the right to repossess four lift trucks which it had
leased to Facings upon any default in payment of rent. In addition, the
entire amount of the contract was to become due immediately. Facings failed
to make a rent payment and Arco sought to recover the entire amount of the
lease, claiming that the "Miscellaneous" clause provided for liquidated
damages. In rejecting Arco's contention, the court said:
[T]he failure to use such language (the contract did not mention "liquidated damages") is a factor in determining whether or
not the parties actually intended a liquidated damages provision.
The contracts in the instant case are devoid of language suggesting
the contemplation of the
that liquidated damages were within 22
parties under the terms of the contracts.
Thus, while the words "liquidated damages" in the contract are inconclusive as to intent, failure to use them may indicate that it was not the intention of the parties to liquidate damages.
REASONABLENESS OF THE SUM PROVIDED

In order for a liquidated damages clause to be valid, it must appear
that the amount stipulated is, viewed as of the time of contracting, reason23
ably proportioned to the probable loss which will ensue from a breach.
In The Standard Brewery v. Johnston,24 a saloon keeper and a brewing company had entered a contract whereby the former agreed for five years to
purchase all his domestic beer from the latter and not to sell or lease the
saloon to anyone who did not enter a similar agreement. The contract contained a $1000 liquidated damages clause. Six months before the end of the
five year period, Johnston sold or rented the saloon to a person who had
not made an agreement with Standard Brewery. The latter brought an
21 18 Ill. App. 2d 110, 151 N.E.2d 438 (lst Dist. 1958).
22 Id. at 117, 151 N.E.2d at 441.
23 McCormick, Damages § 150 (Ist ed. 1935).
24 191 IU. App. 5 (1st Dist. 1914).
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action based on the liquidated damages provision to recover the $1000. The
stipulated sum was construed as having been intended as a penalty because
the contract was to run for five years and, therefore, the damages which
would result would depend on the time of the breach. Consequently, to exact
the sum provided for in the case of a breach occurring shortly before the
expiration of the contract would be oppressive and unconscionable. In other
words, the stipulated sum could not be said to be reasonably proportioned to
the probable loss which would result in the event of a breach because no
consideration was accorded the fact of when a breach might occur.
The fact that a liquidated damages clause may provide for an unreasonable sum also indicates that it was the intention of the parties to impose a
penalty. In Lu-Mi-Nus Signs v. Jefferson Shoe Stores,25 the sign company
brought a contract action against Jefferson and sought to recover the
amount stipulated in a liquidated damages clause. Jefferson contended
that the clause was invalid. The court upheld the clause, but said:
If defendant had introduced evidence showing that the actual
damages were considerably smaller than the amount stipulated,
this could be regarded as an indication that the amount named
was intended as a penalty .... 26
Thus, it would appear that while the stipulated sum is to be tested as to
reasonableness of amount from the viewpoint of the consequences the parties
could foresee at the time of contracting, the fact that the fixed sum far
exceeds actual damage caused by a breach would indicate that their original
effort to estimate damages was not bona fide.
MULTIPLE COVENANTS

The general law where multiple covenants are present was defined in
Iroquois Furnace Co. v. Wilkin Mfg. Co.,2 7 where the court said:
Another rule of construction is that, where an agreement contains several stipulations of various degrees of importance, as to
some of which the damages might be considered liquidated, while
the damages for the nonperformance of the others are not measurable by an exact pecuniary standard, and a sum of money is made
payable in gross for a breach of any of them, such
sum is held to
28
be a penalty only, and not liquidated damages
In Steer v. Brown,29 Steer agreed to purchase Brown's hardware business.
Brown agreed to pay the inventory taxes on his stock for the year 1900, to
lease the premises to Steer for three years, and not to compete in the city of
Wyoming for a prescribed period of time. In the event of a breach of the con25 257 Ill. App. 150 (lst Dist. 1930).
26 Id. at 155.
27 181 Ill. 582, 54 N.E. 987 (1899).
28 Id. at 603, 54 N.E. at 994.
29 106 Ill. App. 361 (2d Dist. 1903).
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tract by either party, the other was entitled to $1000 as liquidated damages.
Brown breached the contract, but refused to pay the $1000, claiming the
clause provided for a penalty. The court ruled for Brown, citing the Iroquois
Furnace case. It said that if Brown had breached the provision that he was
to pay the inventory taxes for the year 1900, the amount of damages would
be only $20 or $30, i.e., the amount of the tax. Surely, Steer could not sue
for $1000 for such a breach and seriously expect to recover. A clause cannot
provide for both liquidated damages and a penalty; it must be one or the
other. Since the clause provided for a penalty, in that it would have required
Brown to pay $1000 for a breach causing only $20 or $30 injury, it was a
penalty as a whole. 80
EXCLUSIVENESS OF REMEDY

If the liquidated damages provision is valid, the damages stipulated fix
the upper limit of recovery, i.e., the plaintiff cannot ignore it and seek to
prove greater actual damages. Obviously, if the clause is invalid, an injured
party may only recover those actual damages which he is able to prove.
A question has arisen as to whether or not a plaintiff may seek a different form of redress than damages when a breach occurs and the contract
provides for liquidated damages. In the absence of a valid provision limiting
the injured party to this singular remedy, he may apparently pursue other
legal remedies. For example, in Bauer v. Sawyer,31 a medical partnership
contract was executed. It provided that in the event one of the doctors elected
to withdraw, he agreed not to practice medicine within a 25 mile radius of
Kankakee for a period of five years. If the withdrawing partner breached this
covenant, "... he shall forfeit any unpaid portion of the purchase price of
his interest."3 2 Sawyer quit the partnership and breached the covenant. The
remaining partners sought an injunction to restrain Sawyer to abide by the
terms of the restriction. Sawyer argued that the clause in the contract provided for liquidated damages and that this was an exclusive remedy. In
granting the injunction, the court stated that even if the provision in question were construed as one for liquidated damages (the court said it was a
penalty), the right to an injunction was not barred because ". . . the entire
agreement indicates the intention of the parties that the covenant . . . be
enforced."3 3
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

Section 2-718 of the Uniform Commercial Code is concerned with the
validity of liquidated damages clauses. While other sections of the Code
introduce changes from the doctrines and rules of the common law, the
80 Id.at 365.
81 8 Ill. 2d 351, 134 N.E.2d 329 (1956).
82 Id. at 354, 134 N.E.2d at 331.
88 Id. at 358, 134 N.E.2d at 332-3.
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liquidated damages section is merely a codification of the common law on
the subject. A reading of subsection (1) makes this apparent:
(1) Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated
in the agreement but only at an amount which is reasonable in the
light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the
difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility
of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing
un84
reasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty.
Thus, it is probably reasonable to assume that the courts, in applying the
Code, will continue to experience as much difficulty as they did under the
common law.
EDWARD HOFFMAN
34 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 26, § 2-718 (1967).

